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China’s Greentech Programs and the
USTR Investigation*
by Joel B. Eisen**

S

Introduction

ince the Renewable Energy Law went into effect in 2006,
the Chinese government has implemented numerous laws
and programs designed to encourage renewables.1 While
China has made strong progress, many factors will influence the
nation’s future success in renewable energy deployment, including the need for consistent pricing policies to stimulate private
sector development and the need to upgrade the country’s transmission grid.2
The issue of China’s support for renewables has taken center stage in a United States Trade Representative (“USTR”)
complaint alleging that China unfairly subsidizes its greentech
industries, in violation of its obligations as a member of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).3 Well before that investigation began, numerous Americans believed the United States
was less engaged in greentech promotion than China,4 and many
feel the United States is falling behind. New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman has been perhaps the most active
proponent of this view,5 but he has plenty of company. If recent
reports are to be believed, China could be generating more electricity from renewables in 2020 than any other nation on Earth.
It has also advanced rapidly in private sector spending on renewable energy technology and research and development spending.
Many observers state that the two nations are engaged in
a new “green energy race.”6 This term deliberately invokes the
“space race” competition between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States to achieve milestones in space after the 1957 launch of the
Sputnik satellite. To simplify matters a bit, there are two related
but different arguments being made. The first is that China will
dominate the global market for greentech, diminishing American companies’ ability to compete with Chinese firms. This, of
course, is the bedrock principle of the USTR investigation, and
must be considered in the context of the complex relationship
between the two nations. The United States has departed from
its “courtship” of China, criticizing it for its currency stance and
other economic policies.7
To some, “losing” the race and falling behind the Chinese
would have serious consequences for national supremacy. Even
senior military leaders recognize that the United States is jeopardizing its future by not taking appropriate steps to address the
dire situation presented by climate change. In this view, failing
to transition to a clean energy economy would leave the United
States vulnerable to ceding its position as a major world power.
Playing into fears about China provided a convenient means
of political theater in the 2010 election season,8 but portraying
China’s ascendancy in greentech as a national threat will have
3

unacceptable costs. Given our nations’ pressing needs to address
climate change, it would be much more productive to forego the
rhetoric of the greentech war and support both nations’ greentech initiatives. Moreover, the reasons given for why China is
“winning” the “race” are not yet completely convincing.
Invoking a race metaphor may be less productive than capturing national attention in the United States with concrete, clear
domestic goals. I believe that the United States should articulate a
single, clear national goal, just as it did with space research in the
Cold War era. Elsewhere, I have argued for the creation of “solar
utilities”9 that would deliver greentech in the residential setting
by consolidating all of the functions of financing, installing, and
servicing in single entities that would ramp up to utility-size scale
in individual areas. This is the sort of idea that could capture the
popular imagination and lead to more greentech development in
the United States than casting China as a competitor.

Geopolitical Competition in Greentech?:
Suitability of the “Space Race” Metaphor
The idea that the United States and China are in a competition for greentech supremacy has many adherents. A recent
Internet search for “China” and “green energy race” yielded
over 300,000 results, with most of the top one hundred having
titles such as “Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race?,”10 “Is
China Beating the U.S. in Green Technology Development?,”11
and so forth. The “China as green competitor” narrative has
captivated journalists,12 bloggers,13 politicians,14 environmentalists,15 think tanks,16 executives of venture capital and energy
companies,17 financial market analysts and commentators,18 and
many others. The USTR investigation is yet another measure of
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the strength of the race idea. Some say the race is already over.
One observer notes, “[t]he United States ceded its leadership
in the production of clean energy technologies during the past
decade of neglect.”19

What Is the “Race,” and Is China “Winning”?
In the space race, there were concrete goals in physical
space: put satellites and humans in orbit, and land a man on
the moon. Here, it is not so clear. What is the competition with
China? To have more solar panels and wind turbines in place?
More governmental and private investment in greentech? More
greentech-friendly governmental policies? All of the above?
Those writing about it often have different agendas. Companies
want more investment in greentech and more access to China’s
markets. Environmentalists want more active federal policies to
encourage deployment of renewables. Free traders want barriers
to trade removed.
Consider a threshold question: Why are we competing with
China? European nations20 have had greentech policies for many
years, have seen strong growth in greentech, and have generated
much electricity from renewables.21 Some observers note that
the race is not with one nation but many,22 yet the prevailing
comparison is to China. There is something more to the “race”
metaphor, then, than growth in greentech. As in the space race,
there is the pervasive sense that if China has more extensive
greentech investments and deployment than we do, there will be
drastic consequences for national power and wealth. Denmark
and Germany attract less attention than China because they pose
less of a threat to the United States’ superpower status.23
Evaluating the “race” claims on their merits, it is hardly
clear that the United States is “losing” to China. The differences
between the two nations are much more subtle than they appear
in the prevailing narrative.24

Growth of China’s Greentech Industry
One fear is that multinational companies will find it difficult to sell their greentech in China, and Chinese companies
will flood the United States with their products. This fear reflects
broader American unease about China’s potential for global economic dominance. In 1979, China began to experiment with the
free market, and since then, has experienced robust growth.25 In
2010, China’s economy had become the world’s second largest,
surpassing Japan’s.26 China’s “pace of industrialization is significantly faster than that experienced by other countries throughout
history.”27 So much of China’s manufacturing output is already
sold in the United States that observers believe we are “joined at
the hip economically.”28 Many believe domestic products cannot compete against those manufactured in China due to China’s
advantages in less expensive labor, more lax protections of intellectual property, fixed currency rates (until very recently), and
weaker environmental protections.29 In the depths of a recession
in the United States, descriptions of growing Chinese greentech
firms invoke images of a rising Asian industrial juggernaut.
Is greentech destined to be another area in which the Chinese overpower American firms? China’s 2007 “Medium and
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China”
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contained an explicit goal to develop a domestic renewables sector.30 China’s wind turbine industry rose from virtual nonexistence to become a major player in the global market in less than
five years. In 2009, three of the largest wind turbine manufacturers in the world were Chinese.31 China leads the world market for solar photovoltaics (“PV”) cells and modules, producing
more than forty percent.32 Chinese firms’ share of the domestic
market has increased rapidly,33 and Chinese companies have
become major players around the globe.34
The USTR petition details a growing imbalance in “environmental goods” between the United States and China,35 but
in some categories, Chinese firms have been less successful in
the United States. Chinese firms sold only 28 megawatt (“MW”)
worth of wind turbines outside of China in 2009.36 Some predict
an upswing in Chinese greentech exports to the United States,37
and at least one high-profile proposed project involving Chinese
technology has attracted negative attention.38
Another factor cited in the USTR investigation is that the
Chinese government appears to be shutting foreign manufacturers out of its domestic market.39 Official Chinese government
policy promotes “indigenous innovation,” calling for reliance
on foreign technology to decrease to thirty percent or less.40
Foreign observers report that it has become more difficult for
foreign companies to get their technology accepted in domestic projects.41 A recent report states that thirty-six government
regulations promote domestic greentech and hamper foreign
firms’ ability to compete in China.42 The USTR investigation
petition claims, for example, that the indigenous innovation policy gives Chinese firms a five to ten percent advantage in wind
turbine procurement processes.43 Encouraging announcements
of joint ventures and other developments seem to contradict
this protectionist trend.44 China has dropped a requirement that
seventy percent of the components in wind turbines come from
domestic sources.45 Agreements between American companies
such as First Solar46 and Chinese local governments to develop
renewable energy projects point to a potentially large market for
American greentech in China.47 Perhaps ironically, however,
the USTR investigation complaint cites the First Solar memorandum of understanding to develop a 2 gigawatt (“GW”) solar
project as impermissible under the WTO because First Solar
agreed to work to support China’s domestic industries.48
The concern seems to be that Chinese firms will dominate
the global greentech market if current growth rates continue.
However, some signs in the past year point to overbuilding and
overcapacity in the wind industry, and a possible retrenchment
and consolidation. In mid-2010, concern about the failure to
agree on a climate change agreement and projections of slowing
demand in China for wind energy made for an uncertain business climate for wind energy companies.49 The top three IPOs
in 2010 in global greentech were by Chinese companies.50 Other
firms moved forward with their offerings,51 but a planned initial
public offering for one firm had to be scrapped in mid-2010 due
to unfavorable market conditions.52
There is also evidence that Chinese firms are not yet competitive in certain market segments. Some provincial utilities
4

have chosen Western wind turbines due to superior control systems and longer experience with manufacturing larger turbine
sizes.53 As recently as 2009, Chinese wind turbines were less
capable than their foreign counterparts,54 as measured by lower
capacity factors (the percentage of time that turbines operate to
generate electricity).55
Chinese firms often do not hold key technology patents that
would enable them to develop more sophisticated equipment.56
Firms have grown rapidly through acquiring manufacturing
equipment and capitalizing on advantages such as their lower
cost of labor.57 As a result, they have a leadership position in
“downstream” areas of the PV production chain, but lag behind
in “upstream” areas requiring more technological skill, such as
silicon purification, ingot, and wafer manufacturing.58 In 2009,
American companies held the top ten cited patents worldwide in
solar technology.59
Many familiar with China believe that it is only a matter
of time before Chinese greentech improves through importing
foreign technology and assimilating it. Even if Chinese solar
and wind technology improves, however, the greentech industry
in the United States is growing.60 The cost advantages of Chinese firms may eventually fade,61 or the gap may close. Chinese
workers increasingly are demanding higher wages and better
working conditions.62 Some greentech, like larger components
of wind turbines, is heavy and expensive to transport.63 In the
American market, the costs of shipping large turbines from
China might outweigh higher domestic labor costs. And American greentech firms enjoy other cost advantages, such as preferential tax policies.64
On the whole, then, Chinese firms are not yet invincible juggernauts displacing their foreign counterparts. There is obvious
concern, as the USTR investigation and high-level discussions
and trade missions suggest.65 Some retort that fear of Chinese
firms is as overblown as rhetoric in the 1980s claiming that mighty
Japan was about to dominate the world economic scene.66 Setting
up China as an economic bogeyman has a potential drawback: it
could imperil the bumpy economic relationship between the two
nations. Some have argued that for this reason alone, it would be
best to drop the rhetoric about a green energy race.67

Central Government Support
Observers believe China’s national government offers consistent and committed support to the greentech sector. In this
view, a Communist nation with a central government planning
process can develop renewables far more quickly.68 However,
the reality is that China occasionally struggles to find consistency in its greentech policies. Some have led to considerable
progress,69 such as the Renewable Energy Law and the 2009
stimulus package,70 but others, including reorganizations of the
governmental energy bureaucracy, have been less successful.71
The most frequently cited instance of government support
is direct financial aid, in the form of low-interest loans, export
promotion, and other aid such as subsidized land made available to developers.72 The USTR complaint cites “prohibited
subsidies to green technology”73 that include the Ministry of
5

Finance’s “Special Fund for Wind Manufacturing,” the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce’s “Export Product
Research and Development Fund,” and the provision of financing through export credits by China’s Export-Import Bank. 74
The state-owned China Development Bank made $42 billion in
loans in 2010 to solar and wind energy companies,75 a sum that
exceeds comparable financing levels in the United States.76
Yet some other policies, such as pricing for electricity generated from renewables added to the national electricity grid, have
been anything but consistently encouraging. Over the past two
years, prices in China’s feed-in tariff for solar have been inconsistent.77 A project priced in late summer 2010 involved a feed-in
tariff of 0.73 renminbi (RMB, $0.108 at 6.8 RMB to the dollar)
per kilowatt-hour.78 This was more than one-third less than a
previous project’s winning bid, which suggests the winning bidder may have been a state-owned enterprise (“SOE”) that could
undercut a private company’s bid. This hybrid system of stateowned and private companies competing for the same projects is
cited in the USTR complaint as disfavoring competition.79 It is an
ongoing challenge to China’s energy system,80 and as one report
observes, “lack of competition reduces efficiencies and innovation that come from open and competitive markets.”81
Until 2009, a bidding tender system was also in place for
electricity generated from wind turbines above 50 MW. That
system was criticized for failing to promote wind power development.82 For smaller wind installations, provincial governments set pricing policies on a project specific basis, which
provided little long-run guidance on pricing. A new system of
“zonal tariffs” largely replaced the previous pricing scheme, but
it is too early to tell whether it will encourage more wind power
development.
No fewer than nineteen governmental bodies have responsibility for some aspect of greentech policy.83 There are inevitable delays in coordination. Ambitious announcements are
not always translated quickly into concrete policies.84 National
proclamations tend to be broad frameworks requiring implementation by administrative organs of the national government.
Unlike the American system, where public involvement can help
steer actions of administrative agencies, the Chinese government has little accountability to accomplish its advertised objectives.85 Key personnel changes in the inner circle of the Chinese
Communist Party can make for policy reversals or alterations.
The Chinese government’s top-down nature creates enormous reliance on provincial and local governments to implement national policies. Robust policy announcements by Beijing
do not easily translate to the provinces,86 and coordination
between national and local officials is difficult.87 Local officials
often have incentives to prefer projects that can deliver shortterm profits,88 not renewable energy projects that might not pan
out for years.89 Some local governments have direct conflicts of
interest between responsibilities to promote SOEs and mandates
to implement national policies.90
The perception that China’s government is unwaveringly
committed to supporting greentech is often accepted uncritically, without these or any other caveats. Observers often jump
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

to conclusions that might be erroneous or oversimplified. It is
difficult to obtain accurate information from China’s national
government, which is secretive and prone to releases of propaganda (as any reader of Xinhua knows).91 Information routinely
available in the West is often protected in China as state secrets,
and recent efforts to promote a freedom of information regime92
show how difficult it is to understand governmental actions.93
According to the USTR petition, “there is a lack of official,
detailed information regarding the terms upon which financing
is provided by China ExIm Bank.”94 Thus, sweeping pronouncements about the Chinese government’s intentions and policies
should be avoided when possible.

The Results Speak for Themselves . . . Or Do They?
By some metrics, Chinese greentech progress is impressive.
In 2009, China obtained a larger share of electricity from renewable sources than the United States (17% versus 8.8%),95 but
this figure is skewed by the predominance of hydroelectric generation in China,96 especially the mammoth Three Gorges Dam
project.97 China added 13.8 GW of new wind power capacity to
10.0 GW for the United States in 2009,98 but its installed total
capacity still trailed that of the United States (35.1 GW versus
25.8 GW). Those numbers cannot be compared directly, as China’s wind projects have been less efficient.99 In 2009, China had
a mere 0.4 GW of grid-connected solar PV capacity,100 though
it pledged to meet a much higher target by 2020.101 The United
States had a larger 1.2 GW of installed PV capacity, still far less
than world leader Germany’s 9.8 GW.102
At present, then, China is not outstripping the United States
in total installed capacity, but it might if it achieves its ambitious targets for 2020—30 GW for wind (or possibly 100 GW,
according to recent reports) and 1.8 GW for solar PV (or possibly as much as an astounding 20 GW).103 However, much of
the increase will be in hydropower.104 And apples should be
compared to apples: Europe and the United States also plan to
increase installed capacity substantially above current levels by
2020.105
Some point to a different metric. Asset financing levels
in China have recently outpaced those of American firms.106
According to a recent report,107 in 2009, Chinese spending
(excluding R&D) totaled $34.6 billion to $18.6 billion for the
United States.108 As the spending levels are within the same
order of magnitude, it does not seem that this is reason for panic.
The real fear seems to be that if the United States does not adopt
progressive climate measures (including a cap-and-trade law),
it will fall further behind China.109 The market data seems to
capture the spirit of American inaction on renewables, but does
it matter, except for international bragging rights, whether the
United States or China occupies the top spot in solar and wind
investment or installed capacity?
Total investment figures or gigawatts of renewable energy
capacity installed do not tell us how China is moving toward
reducing its usage of fossil fuels and achieving climate goals.
China is adding renewable energy capacity rapidly, but is much
more dependent on conventional fossil fuel generation than the
Winter 2011

United States. Coal accounts for a staggering seventy percent
of the nation’s electricity generation capacity.110 Even large
deployment of renewables will not enable China to reduce that
number substantially over the next decade.111 And that only tells
part of the story. China’s growth and increasing appetite of its
citizens for modern conveniences has resulted in rapid increases
in energy demand.112 In 2010, China achieved the dubious milestone of surpassing the United States as the world’s largest primary energy user.113 Its industries are far less energy-efficient
than those in the United States and Japan.114 The government’s
initiatives have helped,115 but China still has a long way to go.
To satisfy its increasing energy demand, China has added
more conventional generation capacity than greentech.116 An
article on China and greentech stated that, “China’s investment
in renewable energy and other green technologies is miniscule
compared to the resources devoted to its continued building of
coal-fired power plants and efforts to secure dirty oil shale supplies in Canada and elsewhere.”117 In 2009, China began construction of a mammoth 13.6 GW power base fueled by coal in
Gansu province, the same location planned for a much-praised
10 GW wind farm.118 New investments in conventional technology made up over one-third of the 134.4 billion RMB (just
under twenty billion dollars) in the first half of 2010.119 As of
2010, China “uses more coal than the United States, Europe, and
Japan combined.”120 That context should be a central part of any
discussion that touts China’s achievements in deploying solar
panels and wind turbines or in greentech financing levels.

Invoking the Space Race Metaphor is CounterProductive for Addressing Climate Change
While many believe the United States is losing the green
energy race, the reality does not yet match the rhetoric. 121
However, there is more at stake. We need to confront a powerful reality: the United States and China are interdependent, not
independent competitors.122 We need China to take the very
actions some posit as competition. This makes the USTR investigation especially unwelcome.123 Without its greentech efforts
and other measures124 such as its announced goal to reduce the
“carbon intensity” of its economy (CO2 emissions per unit of
GDP),125 China’s increasing energy demand and spending on
conventional technology would add considerably to greenhouse
gas emissions.126
There will be no effective global reduction of emissions
that does not include the United States and China,127 because
they are by far the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases.128 Failure by either nation to reduce its emissions
would imperil the entire global effort.129 We should encourage
and support China’s efforts, not consider them a threat to our
national wellbeing.130 Rather than creating the scorched earth
of a “greentech war,”131 both nations can benefit from collaboration.132 The urgency to do this is compelling. No nation has
ever had to address such daunting environmental challenges
at the same time as it has pursued such rapid growth. 133 This
poses major hurdles to tackling climate change that must be surmounted by nations working together. And there are not just two
6

nations involved, but the whole world.134 Rather than creating a
two-nation race, we should encourage China’s domestic policies
and the climate change collaborations of the “BRIC” developing
economies (Brazil, Russia, and India, in addition to China).135
Nationalistic rhetoric on climate change would be especially unfortunate for the U.S.-China relationship on climate
matters. The two nations have ongoing tensions on a whole
host of sensitive topics,136 but have worked productively with
each other to address climate change.137 In the two-year period
of international negotiations between the promulgation of the
Bali Action Plan and the December 2009 Copenhagen summit,
talks took place under the auspices of the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue.138 Discussions also took place during
2009 with world leaders at the Pittsburgh G-20 summit139 and
at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.140 The
two nations have pledged several times to take mutual action
to address climate change,141 and while the promises are often
hortatory, the ongoing discussion does have important value
in strengthening the bilateral relationship.142 Advocating competition with the Chinese undercuts these activities. Continued
antagonistic rhetoric about a clean energy race will also make
it difficult to conduct cooperative efforts in energy and environmental matters. Unlike the near-complete scientific secrecy that
marked the Cold War era,143 China and the United States are
working to develop technology together.
Some even argue that China’s programs to promote renewables can be good for the United States’ economy.144 The Council on Foreign Relations’ Michael Levi, argues that “it’s quite
possible for the United States and China both to win, with China
lowering the cost of relatively low-tech parts of the value chain,
in turn growing the market for the higher-tech parts that are still
handled by the United States.”145 Levi compares this to other
situations in which China manufactures products developed in
the United States.
Finally, greentech warring makes it more difficult to reach a
global climate agreement. According to some accounts, China’s
foot-dragging146 and refusal to adopt binding reduction targets
was in part responsible for the failure of the Copenhagen Accord
to incorporate global binding limits.147 As China’s economy
continues its rapid growth, there will be even greater demand for
it to agree to limit emissions.148 Castigating it for its greentech
policies could foster a climate of distrust and delay further progress on a post-Kyoto agreement.
For all of these reasons, the symbolism of the space race is
simply not helpful in a discussion of global climate change.

Lessons for Energy Policy From the “Space Race”
Blaming China deflects attention from our own inabilities to develop progressive policies on renewables and climate
change. Numerous observers have noted that we lack a stable set
of policies to encourage greentech research, development, and
deployment.149 While we have done well to invent new technologies,150 our efforts to advance them to the commercial stage
and promote their deployment are “fragmented,” spread among
numerous agencies, and lacking coordination.151 As many have
7

noted, “[g]overnment policies can provide a strong impetus for
constructing renewable generation facilities,” and there is a wide
variety of potential incentives, including support for research and
development, tax incentives, government procurement policies,
renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”), carbon cap-and-trade
programs, and feed-in tariffs.152 Federal spending on renewable energy is both anemic in its overall levels153 and, even after
the added billions of dollars in the 2009 stimulus package,154
well behind that devoted to fossil fuels.155 Federal tax policy for
renewables is inconsistently supportive,156 and in some years,
many new projects come to fruition, but the pipeline often dries
up.157 The cyclical pace of support “clearly illustrates the consequences of on-again, off-again short-term federal incentives for
wind as a market signal.”158
Some Obama administration actions are similar to actions
taken in response to Sputnik, such as the creation of a Cabinetlevel position to address climate change, which echoes governmental reorganizations taken in the late 1950s. One action
that is especially comparable and noteworthy is the funding of
the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (“ARPA-E”)
with four hundred million dollars from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) stimulus package. ARPAE’s name and mission deliberately echo that of the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (“ARPA”)159 created after Sputnik in
the Department of Defense.
The moon landing was the product of an amalgamation of
many disparate efforts to develop different types of technologies.
So too is energy research and development. Like the Apollo program, it is not clear at the outset which technology will prevail,
so we need to work on a variety of fronts over a long period of
time. Programs established in the stimulus package are temporary, not the comprehensive approach we need.160
Much of our effort to develop greentech is mired in a rut. No
climate bill, renewable electricity standard, or national feed-in
tariff is forthcoming.161 Progress toward a stand-alone national
renewable electricity standard is doubtful.162 Many have noted
the failure of federal leadership163 and the actions of progressive states that have stepped into the void with their own programs.164 These policies are not uniform throughout the country.
A national program may achieve results that piecemeal state and
regional efforts underway cannot.165
How can we make more progress? Addressing climate
change requires the kind of committed and strong support from
the federal government that the space program received throughout the 1960s.166 The race is really to meet a national goal that
we have articulated and that is in our national self-interest,
whether or not it has geopolitical significance. We put a man
on the moon in part because we were captivated by the idea of a
simple, clear goal. I have focused on one idea that could catalyze
a push toward rapidly increasing development of renewables: a
“solar utility” that would reduce the upfront cost of panels to
nearly zero by subsidizing and installing them at houses.167
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Conclusion
China has become a major player in greentech in a short
amount of time. If it could keep up its breakneck pace of
growth it might look like it has pulled far ahead of us in the new
“green energy race,” but at present the picture is more muddled.
The “space race” metaphor and the USTR investigation are

counterproductive in that they pit the two nations against each
other, when they should emphasize interdependence and cooperation. In the end, competing with China in greentech is about as
useful as “energy independence.” It may be much more productive to convince Americans that their nation’s future depends on
investment in renewables through a specific national goal.
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